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Abstract 
The paper presents considerations on the possible consequences associated with the 
lockdown condition that ensued on the coronavirus pandemic. On the one hand, the 
infection brought about a notable intensification of primary relationships, in particular 
within the family and the domestic space in general, while, on the other hand and 
especially at the start, it generated strong symbolic integration, shown for example by 
events such as flashmobs and other forms of the grassroot involvement of individuals. 
Through empirical research data, we will attempt to understand to what extent the 
cultural climate prevalent in Italy through March and April influenced the attitudes of 
the Italians in terms of general interpersonal trust or trust in the institutions, as well as 
in terms of culture and civic engagement. For this purpose, the paper uses data taken 
from two empirical research on a sample of about 1,000 cases among the Italian 
population. It will be compared the evidence resulting from a first survey realized at the 
end of 2017 and the data collected in a second survey carried out on a sample of the 
same size (that presents a panel quota of 700 cases) ending on April 30 2020, i.e., at the 
end of the lockdown period. 
The variables to be analysed are relative to general interpersonal trust, trust in the 
institutions and civic engagement activities. 
Such items will function as dependent variables and will be analysed in a diachronic 
perspective comparing the two panel samples. Furthermore, they will be observed in 
relation to their distribution throughout Italy, to the age of the interviewees and to their 
civil status, in an attempt to discover any connection between family life and the attitude 
towards civil society, keeping in mind the dynamics triggered in everyday life by the 
pandemic. 
Keywords: trust, civic engagement, Italian lockdown. 
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1.  Introduction 
Many are the interpretations and reflections, philosophical, sociological 
and psychological, relative to the period of the coronavirus pandemic and to 
what consequences it will have within society. Web conferencing and discussion 
meetings on the topic have also been held in Italy, one on the heels of the other. 
It is absolutely clear that the various lockdowns which were, and unfortunately 
continue to be, necessary in various parts of the world, have completely 
disorganised our social relationships. 
With the obligation to remain at home for a long time, private family 
relations were strongly intensified with consequences that are investigated at 
theoretical and empirical levels in this issue of the Italian Sociological Review1. 
There was a shift from the strong investment outside the home: school, work, 
free time and sociability2, to the exclusive investment on activities carried out 
within the home and on instruments and techniques that enabled forms of 
mediation with the outside world. Such a situation brought home to us the 
extent to which, in many parts of the world, even in the most modernised 
countries, the family and the relations between family members are still 
considered a natural resource in which the institutions constantly, and in certain 
extreme cases exclusively, place their trust, when it is a question of taking care 
of people’s well-being. 
Sociologically, we wonder what produced the inversion which single 
individuals had to carry out on their own investment in their spheres of life 
within and beyond their own home. Most of the contributions in this special 
issue of the review are devoted to the analysis of intimate, private relations. This 
essay, on the other hand, is on the sphere of relations beyond the domestic 
circle and will investigate the type of attitude of people towards the generalised 
other, towards public goods and the institutions at the end of the lockdown 
stage. 
The analysis will be carried out using the empirical evidence emerging from 
two waves of surveys conducted on a sample of individuals from the national 
population. 
Paragraph 2 offers the reader a reflection on certain social events that 
occurred in Italy during the lockdown. At the end of paragraph 2, the aims of 
the research are briefly presented. Paragraph 3 outlines the theoretical 
framework of reference containing the concept of trust, as the main object of 
 
1 For further empirical evidence on the Italian case, see also Casfr (2020). 
2 The concept of sociability was introduced into sociology by Georg Simmel (1949) to 
define those forms of relationship with no particular purpose other than that of coming 
together for the mutual enjoyment of one another’s company. 
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this research. Paragraph 4 supplies the methodological and technical 
information that constitutes the perimeter within which the research went 
forward. Paragraph 5 gives the reader the analysis of the main empirical 
evidence gathered in the investigation. Paragraph 6 analyses the distribution of 
trust levels and civic commitment levels among the different categories of 
population, bearing in mind their proximity to the COVID-19 risk. 
2.  Lockdown and the morphogenesis of primary and secondary social 
relations 
As already mentioned, the imposition of lockdown modified the 
equilibrium among primary social relations, community relations and 
generalised secondary relations. We can say that throughout the approximately 
two-month period, a substantial part of the Italian population was forced to 
give up the differentiation between the family and the rationalized organisations 
(like the firm), which, according to Max Weber (1922), has made up and 
characterised modern western society, capitalist and industrialised. Many people 
found, at the lockdown, they had to manage their workload while dealing with 
preparing meals and running the household generally speaking, as well as 
looking after the children and supervising their school activities. From the 
sociological point of view, the sudden lack of such a founding distinction of 
social life in modern western civilisations, together with the fear of the serious 
biological risks triggered by the virus, cannot fail to have had an effect on the 
social attitudes of individuals. 
As public opinion beyond the Italian frontiers heard, the Italian population 
reacted to confinement within the home and to the widespread pandemic of 
fear by having recourse to sociability, in other ways and through other means 
(electronic, etc.), and by attempting a collective exorcising of fear through 
creative events such as flash mobs and symbolic signs of any kind hanging in 
the windows and on the balconies, or else holding friendship and community 
evenings organised by means of the widest possible applications of 
videoconferencing or video-meetings. These were events and episodes which 
overcame territorial boundaries, making the headlines in numerous other 
countries both in the west and in the east. They testified to a grassroots 
solidarity generated by a non-organised civil society as the expression of a kind 
of community need (Bauman, 2000), something to hold on to in order to 
confront looming risks and as an appeal to latent forms of social and trust 
bonds. 
Besides this spontaneous phenomenon, other more highly structured 
forms of solidarity came into being. Experiences of organised solidarity were 
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set in motion and, in some cases, went in search of the emerging movements 
towards trust and solidarity.  For example, the Centro di Servizi per il Volontariato 
della Lombardia (CSVnet), the Lombardy Volunteer Service Centre: Lombardy 
was the Italian region worst hit by the virus. The CSVnet announced that more 
than three thousand volunteers came forward to deal with the health 
emergency. Padua, the 2020 capital for volunteer work, mobilised 1,600 
volunteers to handle the emergency. Each of these testified to the reaction of 
the Italian citizens to the pandemic event, leading each one to become involved 
in the more organised spheres of civil society, thus transmitting trust to the so-
called intermediate organisations. 
One hypothesis is that the risks and fears generated by the pandemic 
encouraged the Italians; finding themselves face-to-face with an unknown, 
insidious danger they looked outward in search of forms of reassurance of the 
most variable nature. This is the hypothesis to be explored, the aim of the 
research discussed here. For the moment, we can say that almost certainly safety 
was sought through science. The scientific system during the pandemic won the 
trust of public opinion, ready to turn on the radio and television channels that 
broadcast information on how to deal with the disease. Yet at the same time, 
and in some ways surprisingly, the politicians as well, called upon to make 
important, distressing choices, turned to science and acknowledged its 
dependability and credibility, loading – or perhaps off-loading – onto it the 
responsibility of those same political choices. During the first stage, public 
opinion appreciated the operation of transferring trust and credibility towards 
science. 
To put it briefly, we can say that initially the public’s reaction to the 
coronavirus was to look for resources as a basis for their own reassurance in front of the 
looming danger. In most cases, we are talking of resources that are symbolical 
rather than material and economic. Hence, judging by an interpretation of 
information coming from the media, it seems that the public set their trust in 
scientific knowledge on the one hand, and, on the other, in social resources 
such as trust and credibility, cooperation and solidarity, which we could briefly 
list under concepts such as social credit and social capital. Sociologically, we 
might conjecture that, faced with concerns for the future, the public set out to 
search for forms of economic credit (the Marxist material bases of society) on 
the one hand and symbolical and social credit on the other. Now we have to 
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3.  Trust, social credit and civic engagement. The theoretical frame of 
reference 
The concept of trust enjoys wide coverage in the literature of sociological 
scientific community. In order to provide the theoretical frame for the work of 
analysing data, we will pause here on certain general theoretical references and 
some specific conceptual distinctions regarding the concept itself. 
The phenomenological approach to sociology may supply a starting point 
for our thinking; by that, we do not intend to imply that we are staking a 
theoretical claim to all the following reflections. We can however agree that the 
coronavirus has produced a sudden, radical breakdown in the ‘taken for granted 
world’ (Schutz, 1962) that has been constructed over time by the different 
spheres of social relations. From one day to the next, the social world on which 
we depended suddenly altered, and with it, to a certain extent, also the natural 
and biological environment. Routines we had taken for granted abruptly failed 
(Garfinkle, 1967). The social dynamics emerging with the lockdown seem to 
have overturned certain ‘obvious’ socio-psychological thinking, such as Hall’s 
proxemics theory (1966). Interpersonal distances have been imposed by law on 
distances, normally graduated, according to Hall, in a measure inversely 
proportionate to the relational proximity of the people involved. These are 
measurements relating to the willingness of one person to allow another to 
access his space bubble, and therefore they also relate to the degree of 
confidence/trust each person have in other people. At every encounter it has 
become necessary to wonder what distance should be maintained, how to greet 
others in everyday ways of interacting. In other words, people have had to 
reformulate from scratch the meanings of signs traditionally used in 
interpersonal relationships by translating into practice new rules of indications 
broadcasted on the mass media by scientists and politicians. 
In fact the steps taken to institute the most stringent lockdown and the 
alert measures following upon the lockdown are, if closely examined, 
interventions taken on the fiduciary foundations on which a good many of our 
primary, community and systemic relations are based, and probably taken 
without full awareness. Some thoughts on the latter are necessary, since 
interventions that alter trust levels may be fraught with social consequences. As 
well as being an intrinsic element in any interpersonal relationship, trust is an 
attitude that carries out an important function in society as a whole. As the neo-
functionalist systems theory of Niklas Luhmann3 suggests, trust is a powerful 
mechanism for the fluidisation and acceleration of social dynamics.  
 
3 In this case too the citation of the theory does not intend to stake a claim to the 
epistemological and methodological positions of the research.  
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Where there is trust there are increased possibilities for experience and action, 
there is an increase in the complexity of the social system and also in the 
number of possibilities which can be reconciled with its structure, because 
trust constitutes a more effective form of complexity reduction (Luhmann, 
1979: 8). 
 
The lockdown certainly took place through these mechanisms, reducing 
the social complexity and the possibilities of experience and action of 
individuals. It is probably no coincidence that the E.U. it has started a long 
discussion in an attempt to restart social dynamism and to reopen the possibility 
of experience and action through the injection of money into the economic 
system. Indeed, money is another powerful symbolic means of making social 
relationships fluid, dynamic and reliable, thus increasing the possibilities for 
experience and action. 
On this specific topic, the institutions have not found a way to develop a 
thoughtful awareness, one reason being that trust dynamics are taken for 
granted in everyday life and because the institutions were forced to take 
decisions under the pressure of an emergency. The present contribution intends 
to observe, and to measure through certain proxy variables, whether it is 
possible to find modifications in trust levels in Italy at the end of the stringent 
Italian lockdown, beginning on March 10 2020 and lasting until May 3 2020, for 
a period of 55 days. Data will be used from the two panel samples interviewed 
at a distance of some months (November 2017, April 2020) and we will attempt 
to observe whether, in that time interval, there is evidence of modifications in 
levels of generalised interpersonal trust and trust in the various types of 
institutions. Since the global event triggered by the coronavirus happened 
during that time period, the comparison between the various levels of trust 
registered in the two surveys will be used as proxies to test the hypothesis of 
any influence brought about by the social distancing on trust attitudes. It is 
certainly no more than an explorative investigation, capable merely of 
formulating hypotheses for further detailed work. In fact modifications in trust 
levels may have been caused by other boundary variables which we are unable 
to verify. However, the close proximity of the survey with the closing date of 
the most stringent lockdown imposed on the Italian population4 must 
undoubtedly have had at least some influence on factors such as generalised 
interpersonal trust or trust in the institutions.  
 
4 For a series of general sociological considerations and an account of certain events 
characterising the outbreak of the pandemic and the start of the most stringent 
lockdown, see Migliorati (2020). For some critical analysis see also Lévy (2020). 
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As Uslaner (2002, ch. 2) observes, two types of trust can be distinguished, 
one strategic and one moral. Strategic trust is what the individual places in other 
individuals on the basis of specific relational experiences. It is the trust based 
on expectations of a rational type and it uses empirical verification to decide 
whether to trust that other person. In social science circles, it is the type of trust 
studied through collective action theories and the game theory (van 
Witteloostuijn 2003). It presupposes an attitude of the suspension of trust, and 
of risk calculation understood as the rational-instrumental form of guide to 
action driven by cognitive expectations (Luhmann, 1972). Moral trust for 
Uslaner is an unconditional attitude, generalised rather than addressing specific 
people. It is the trust that we place in our fellow beings in general, almost a sort 
of prerequisite for social relations. It is the type of trust that more than any 
other allows our social relations to become dynamic and fluid, multiplying the 
scope of experience and action of which we have already spoken. It is 
empirically studied by the social sciences, operationalising it as ‘generalised 
interpersonal trust’, long investigated through theoretical and empirical 
research. It is on this last concept that part of the empirical analyses of the 
present work will be based, while we leave specific (strategic) interpersonal trust 
in the background. For a long time the social sciences have been musing on 
what contexts socialise the individual towards generalised trust. A number of 
theoreticians (Almond, Verba, 1963; Putnam, 1993; 2000) hold that it is the 
experience of social relations in the organisations of civil society (associations 
and the other organised non-profit forms) that develops a generalised attitude 
of trust in individuals towards other individuals. Certain empirical research data 
show higher levels of generalised trust among people belonging to such 
organisations. Other scholars (Rothstein, Stolle, 2003; 2008; Rothstein, Uslaner, 
2005; Stolle, 1998; 2001) maintain that it is the good working of the public 
institutions5 to generate trust attitudes towards other members of society in 
general. Other research works (Stolle, 2003) reveal a correlation among family 
life experiences and generalised trust. Variables such as associative experiences, 
civil status and family conditions will be taken into consideration in the analyses 
that follow in order to control the influence of family life on trust. A further 
scientific precaution must be remembered: that suggested by those (Bjørnskov, 
2006) who query the ‘direction’ of the causation process, believing that 
generalised trust, rather than being a dependent variable, may be considered as 
an independent variable which perhaps influences variables such as the good 
 
5 By the good working of public institutions we mean the actions of those service 
organisations (therefore not political parties or organisations safeguarding specific 
interests) which operate more in direct contact with the public, pursuing aims of equality 
and impartiality of treatment and sending out an image of reliability. 
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functioning of institutions, belonging to an association, the development of 
democracy and the economic system itself. 
In the pages that follow we discuss the data relative to modifications in 
trust levels, generalised and institutional, found at the end of the stringent Italian 
lockdown stage. 
4.  Empirical research 
The analysis will be carried out using the empirical evidence emerging from 
the two waves of surveys on a sample of individuals from the national 
population. The first survey was in 2017, from November 16-21, on a sample 
of 1,000 cases, to whom a CAWI (computer assisted web interview) system 
questionnaire was administered. The survey was carried out by the Italian 
research organisation Swg, which has at its disposal a panel of approximately 
60,000 registered names, profiled by the research company reproducing the 
stratification of the national population according to the main socio-
demographic variables (sex, age, macro-geographic area of residence). Using the 
random method, the sample for the first survey was extracted from this set. The 
second survey was conducted from April 24-30 2020 and finished only a few 
days before the end of the lockdown stage caused by COVID-19. Out of the 
1,000 interviewees involved in the first stage, 724 (i.e., 71.6%) responded to the 
second survey. To this sample panel, 287 cases were added as replacements 
(fresh sample) in order to achieve the same territorial distribution according to 
age and sex as the sample for the first survey. 
The two waves of the research were designed by a group of researchers 
from the Universities of Verona and Padua. As well as the present author, Anna 
Maria Meneghini (University of Verona), Massimo Santinello (University of 
Padua) and Marta Gaboardi (University of Padua) were involved. The two sets 
cannot be properly considered in the strictest sense as probabilistic samples 
with respect to the Italian population. However, the online sample, having been 
randomly extracted, is statistically representative of the set of 60,000 
respondents profiled by Swg6. 
Data on generalised interpersonal trust will be compared and set in relation 
to another type of trust, trust in the institutions. As in the case of interpersonal 
trust, we will explore the variation in the levels of the mean values of trust in 
different social institutions, in the hypothesis that the incidence of social 
confinement imposed by the political institutions may have had an effect on 
 
6 On the methodology of investigations via web see Callegaro et al. (2015). In particular, 
on the methods for online sampling and on the representativeness of the samples 
extracted from a profiled panel, see paras. 2.2 and 5.2 in the same work. 
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any variations. Furthermore, we will check whether there are any correlations 
between institutional trust and the interviewee’s data profile, as well as the level 
of correlation between interpersonal generalised trust and trust in institutions7. 
Institutional trust is measured by means of a synthetic index, constructed by 
summing a battery of answers to the question: ‘On a scale from 0 to 10 where 
0 is not at all and 10 is a great deal, can you say how much trust you place in: a) 
public institutions; b) private businesses; c) religious institutions; d) non-profit 
organizations; e) political parties; f) trade unions’. The scores obtained were 
added together and the total was divided by the number of institutions, arriving 
at a synthetic index that varies from 0 to 10. 
A further variable to be analysed and set in relation with the concept of 
trust is civic engagement. In this case too, the concept is measured through a 
synthetic index constructed by summing the positive answers to various types 
of civic engagement conduct: ‘In this last year, have you happened to: a) sign a 
public petition or a signature collection; b) take part in a meeting to discuss 
issues regarding your community, district or area of residence; c) contribute to 
fund raising for social solidarity and charity purposes; d) intervene on political 
questions in a newsgroup/chat-line/mailing list’. 
In order to facilitate the analysis, and in particular the comparison between 
the two waves of survey, the variables relative to generalised interpersonal trust, 
trust in institutions, civic engagement, interest in politics (which are continuous 
or interval numerical variables) have been re-codified in ordinal variables in 
three levels: high, medium and low8. 
 
7 In their recent essay, Belardinelli and Gili (2020) offer a theoretical reflection on the 
forms of trust and the possible influence exerted by COVID-19. As well as the forms 
mentioned here and empirically analysed: 1) specific interpersonal trust, 2) generalised 
interpersonal trust and 3) institutional trust, the two authors also recall systemic trust, 
that is the form of institutional trust which, instead of addressing specific institutions 
such as politics, the church, political parties, non-profit organisations etc., considers the 
institutional sphere in a generalised way. This substantially refers to the trust that each 
citizen places in the functioning of the social system overall. Such as, for example, trust 
in the functioning of the road system, traffic signals, or trust in the adequate 
maintenance of public transport, and so on. Naturally the experience of the health 
emergency has highlighted this social dimension as well, yet we can say that stringent 
confinement has in a certain way made this dimension less relevant and it will not be 
analysed in this work, partly through lack of indicators due to the present paper being 
planned before the publication of the two sociologists’ article.  
8 For technical reasons, it was not possible to have a single data matrix containing the 
variables of the two survey waves. In the analysis of cross-references given it is not 
possible to calculate significance indices. However, through Microsoft’s Excel 
application was carried out an ANOVA of the variables found in the two researches 
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5.  Modifications in levels of trust and civic engagement in Italy at the 
end of the lockdown 
First of all, let us look at the modifications of generalised interpersonal 
trust measured in the two waves of survey. At the end of the lockdown, the 
level of such trust had risen with respect to the survey of two years earlier. In 
particular, as we can see in Table 1, 33.5% of the interviewees was at the high 
level of the trust index in 2020 against 25.2% in 20179. We may make the 
hypothesis that that confinement period turns out to be a variable that 
influenced and contributed to increase generalised interpersonal trust10. 
Required to keep the social distance and to stay at home, it would seem 
(paradoxically?) that trust in the generalised other increased. The instruction to 
maintain a distance might generate a sort of fear of the stranger, experienced as 
a potential source of infection. Instead the data seem to deny such an outlook 
and point towards the hypothesis that confinement produced the opposite 
effect. A hypothesis corroborated by theoretical considerations as well. In fact, 
during the first stage of the pandemic, voices were raised on the part of 
intellectuals, men of culture and spiritual figures underlining the fact that the 
illness highlighted a common, universal belonging of individuals to humankind. 
The coronavirus put us all in the same boat. The Slovak philosopher and 
sociologist Slavoj Žižek, in his pamphlet on the virus (2020) quotes Martin 
Luther King who thus summarised citizens from various ethnic backgrounds 
being part of American society: «We may have all come on different ships, but 
we’re in the same boat now»; the philosopher advances the hypothesis that the 
virus may produce generalised solidarity. Furthermore, he suggests that physical 
distancing may lay the foundations for a ‘more authentic access to the other’. 
As an atheist, Žižek quotes the ‘noli mi tangere’ of the Christian scriptures to 
clarify this opinion of his. With a different attitude towards the Christian 
scriptures and enjoying a greater share of public opinion, Pope Francis has also 
used the metaphor of the boat on which humanity finds itself. He did so on the 
occasion of the global prayer for the end of the pandemic. Tossed by the storm, 
the boat with the disciples is used as an icon of vulnerability and of the common 
 
and was calculated the F value. Each of the analyses done produced an index of 
significance p < 0.001. 
9 In terms of average value, the value of 5.9 in 2017 passed to 6.4 in 2020. With a value 
of F equal to 24.00 and a significance test value of p < 0.001. 
10 Some observers have noted that during this period, among the topics debated in 
Italian public opinion, the immigration issue appeared to have totally vanished. 
Immigration no longer seemed to be a problem. This piece of information, should it be 
confirmed empirically, might be associated to an attitude of greater generalised 
interpersonal trust that developed during lockdown.  
Sandro Stanzani 
Trust and Civic Engagement in the Italian COVID-19 Lockdown 
 927 
condition of humanity. The theme of vulnerability as the common cypher of 
humanity has been recalled, in recent years, by the social sciences as the 
platform on which to rest the development scenarios of human societies. 
Belardinelli (2007), for example, holds that, rather than being characterised by 
the figure of homo sapiens or homo faber, humanity finds its distinctive features in 
homo patiens. On the same subject, see – among others – the works of authors 
such as Nussbaum (2001), Cavarero (2007), Ehrenberg (2010). 
TABLE 1. Levels of trust, civic engagement and interest in politics in the 2017 and 2020 surveys. 
  2020 2017 
 Levels % n % n 
Generalised interpersonal trust  
Low 29.8  38.7  
Medium 36.7 1011 36.1 1000 
High 33.5  25.2  
Trust in institutions 
Low 40.2  29.8  
Medium 27.3 1011 27.1 1000 
High 32.5  43.1  
 Low 31.9  51.2  
Civic engagement Medium 31.6 1011 24.7 1000 
 High 36.5  24.1  
 Low 40.4  37.5  
Interest in politics Medium 38.0 1011 29.3 1000 
 High 21.7  33.2  
 
The empirical data on generalised interpersonal trust at the end of the 
lockdown seems to support this hypothesis, as does another empirical support 
if we analyse the index of civic engagement and the hours devoted to gratuitous 
activities for the benefit of other people (not family members, relatives or 
friends) as revealed in the two surveys. For these two variables we find an 
increase in the values with the passage from the 2017 survey to that of 2020. 
Specifically, the 5.52 hours of 2017 pass to 8.19 hours in 2020 devoted to 
gratuitous activities benefiting non-family members and non-relatives. 
Furthermore, we see an increase in those found at the high level of the civic 
engagement index, passing from a value of 24.1% in 2017 to 36.5% in 202011. 
As the break-down analysis in Table 2 confirms, this increase is explained by 
the consistent increase in 2020 of activities such as joining in fund raising 
(+12.7%) which was strongly encouraged by the media during confinement. 
Yet, with similar and greater percentages, other types of behaviour also increase 
such as participating in meetings for the discussion of community problems 
(+15%) or signing public petitions or the collection of signatures (+8.2%) and 
 
11 The mean value of such an index, in a range from 0 a 10, passes from 3.9 in 2017 to 
4.6 in 2020, with a value of F equal to 26.02 and a significance of p < 0.001. 
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intervention on political questions within chats, newsgroups etc. The set of data 
on civic behaviour and trust attitudes confirms the idea that the stay-at-home 
period encouraged a positive outlook of the Italians towards other individuals.   
There is however a different approach regarding trust in the institutions. 
In this case there is a clear reduction of those positioned at the high level of the 
index; they go from 43.1% in 2017 to 32.5% in 2020, showing a general loss of 
trust in all the institutions, with no great difference one from another12. 
TABLE 2. Civic modes of conduct and ‘short’ solidarity. 
 2020 2017 
In the last year, have you happened to: % n % n 
Sign a public petition or a collection of 
signatures? 
55.9 1011 47.7 1000 
Take part in a meeting to discuss issues 
regarding your community, district or area 
of residence?  
37.4 1011 32.4 1000 
Contribute to fund-raising for social 
solidarity purposes and charity? 
57.9 1011 45.2 1000 
Intervene on political issues in the ambit 
of newsgroups/chat-lines/mailing lists? 
34.6 1011 31.0 1000 
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hours devoted to gratuitous activity for 
the benefit of others in the last month   
8.19 15.82 5.52 20.58 
 
As Table 3 shows, presenting data relative to the degree of trust in the 
diverse institutions that go to make up the synthetic index, the Third Sector is 
the ambit which enjoys the greatest trust on the part of public opinion, followed 
by businesses and by the Church; at the bottom of the list, as often happens, 
are the political parties and trade unions. The classification does not change 
passing from 2017 to 2020. Certainly, this information showing the Third Sector 
as the most reliable institution among them all is highly relevant and 
corroborates the theories on its existence (Hansmann, 1987). However, what 
deserves mention here is that, over the period analysed, the mean of trust values 
decreased in all the institutions under examination, without exception, even 
those best considered such as the non-profit organisations. 
In fact, it seems that increased risk and isolation has meant that the 
relevance of the institutional dimensions has diminished while the basic trust in 
other people in general, considered as individuals, has risen. The generalised 
other, less frequently met when confined at home, has seen an increase in 
reliability, while the institutions, on which the media kept us informed, 
 
12 In this case the mean value of the index of institutional trust went from 4.2 in 2017 
to 3.9 in 2020, with F = 13.67 and p < 0.001. 
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underwent a drop in their consensus. They are judged to be less reliable in 
confronting the risks and subjective difficulties coming to the fore due to 
individual vulnerability towards contagion. This impression of the lower 
reliability of the institutions seems to be confirmed also by the information 
relative to interest in politics, whose mean values fell in the time interval from 
2017 to 2020, going from 33.2% to 21.7% in the high level of the index. 
TABLE 3. Analysis of the variance of variables relative to trust in the institutions in 2017 and 
2020. 
 2020 2017 
F 
 Mean Var.nce n Mean Var.nce n 
Trust in public bodies (0-10) 4.38 5.30 1011 4.48 6.43 1000 0,81 
Trust in businesses (0-10) 4.42 4.64 1011 5.00 5.00 1000 30.15*** 
Trust in the Church (0-10) 4.20 7.2 1011 4.68 7.65 1000 15.48*** 
Trust in the third sector (0-10) 4.96 5.78 1011 5.49 6.3 1000 20.44*** 
Trust in political parties (0-10) 2.51 5.8 1011 2.58 6.73 1000 0.43 
Trust in trade unions (0-10) 2.82 6.56 1011 3.00 7.11 1000 2.18 
*** p < 0.001 
 
Observing the variables in relation one to the others (analysis of 
correlations in Table 4) we see that, with Pearson’s r value of 0.463, 
interpersonal generalised trust is strongly and significantly correlated to trust in 
institutions. In theory, this does not surprise us as we are dealing with two forms 
of trust that refer to each other. However, it is striking that this happens even 
if in the second wave of survey, confronted with an increase in interpersonal 
trust we find a reduction in institutional trust, which seems to go separate ways 
from the path of a reciprocal association. The other variables also present 
positive correlations, especially those between interest in politics and civic 
engagement (0.343), to which are added those with trust in institutions (0.257) 
and generalised trust (0.255). The correlation is less strong between civic 
engagement and forms of trust (institutional 0.209, generalised 0.173). All values 
presented change little if the same analysis is carried out on the sample from the 
first survey. 
Lastly, it is worth noticing the type of correlation existing between the 
number of associations to which the interviewees belong and the correlation 
with levels of trust and civic engagement. Observing the data in the two 
different findings, we see first of all that there is no change in the average 
number of associations to which the interviewees declare they belong. The 
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figure goes from 0.98 in 2017 to 0.99 in 2020. But if we correlate this figure 
with the other variables so far analysed, we see that belonging to an association 
has a higher r value in the case of the civic engagement index (0.204***) and 
less than 0.200 in the case of institutional trust (0.183***) and of generalised 
interpersonal trust (0.168***). This means that the association experience may 
function as a socialisation agency above all towards civic engagement conduct, 
rather than towards trust attitudes. The data on the socialisation function of 
associationism towards the dimensions of the social capital require further 
empirical confirmation which, as we already said, the literature does not as yet 
contain. However, it is important to notice how the lockdown context probably 
saw the associations carry out a socialisation role towards civic engagement, 
given that in the 2020 survey the r value rose to (0.357***), while the r values 
relative to generalised and institutional trust remained more or less the same. 














Pearson’s r     
Sig.     
n     
Trust in 
institutions 
Pearson’s r 0.463    
Sig. p < 0.001    
n 1011    
Civic 
engagement 
Pearson’s r 0.173 0.209  0.257 
Sig. p < 0.001 p < 0.001  p < 0.01 
n 1011 1011  1011 
Interest in 
politics 
Pearson’s r 0.255 0.257 0.343  
Sig. p < 0.05 p < 0.01 ,p < 0.001 - 
n 1011 1011 1011  
Association 
membership 
numbers in 2017 
(mean 0.98) 
Pearson’s r 0.168 0.183 0.204  
Sig. p < 0.05 p < 0.01 ,p < 0.001 - 
n 1000 1000 1000  
Association 
membership 
numbers in 2020 
(mean 0.99) 
Pearson’s r 0.143 0.184 0.357  
Sig. p < 0.05 p < 0.01 ,p < 0.001 - 
n 1011 1011 1011  
6.  Distribution of levels of trust and civic engagement in categories of 
the Italian population 
Let us now see which of the interviewees best explain the phenomenon of 
the increase in general interpersonal trust. 
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6.1 Social-demographic features of the interviewees 
Here we present the result of a series of crosstabulations carried out for 
the variable of the generalised interpersonal trust level with the variables of the 
interviewees’ profiles13. We will examine only the crosstabulations that pass the 
significance test and supply information on the features of those interviewees 
who achieve higher percentages in the high level of trust. The interviewees for 
whom the interpersonal trust level is highest are males living in medium-sized 
towns (with populations of between 100 thousand and 250 thousand), living 
with a partner, with a high level of religious practice, and with a high monthly 
income (more than four thousand euros). 
We will proceed in the same way regarding trust in institutions; however, 
since we find a drop in that type of trust, we observe the features of those who 
are present to a greater degree in the low level of the index. Having low levels 
of institutional trust are mainly the residents in the North-West; probably the 
fact that the epicentre of the infection was in Lombardy played a very important 
role in explaining that result. Furthermore, presenting a mainly low level of 
institutional trust are those with a low level of religious practice or unbelievers, 
and those who have a low income (less than two thousand euros per month). 
Lastly, we observe the features of those with a high level of civic 
engagement. They are mainly male, with high educational qualifications, strong 
religious practice or unbelievers, and an income of over 4 thousand euros. 
6.2 Level of ‘proximity’ to the COVID-19 risk 
After carrying out this first identikit of the population, we analyse the type 
of experience the interviewees had with the coronavirus. We are assisted by the 
variables presented in Table 5, from which we see that one fifth of the 
interviewees had been in quarantine and 13.8% had a loved one diagnosed with 
COVID-19. 
Through the same questions in Table 5 is presented a dichotomous variable 
that was constructed of the subjective experience or perception of proximity to 
COVID-19, from which we see (Table 6) that 65.2% of the interviewees had 
no subjective experience or perception of being exposed to or in proximity of 
the coronavirus, while the respective 34.8% had some experience or performed 
some act that refers to a contact with the coronavirus (asking the doctor for 
information, going to A&E, doing the tampon, having an acquaintance affected 
by COVID-19, etc.). 
 
13 The tables with the results of the analyses would require too much space, therefore 
they have not been included in the text. 
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It is interesting to note that whoever answered yes to each question in 
Table 5 possesses greater generalised interpersonal and institutional trust, and 
presents a higher level of civic engagement than whoever answered no. The 
exception is the case of the mean of the generalised interpersonal trust degree 
of whomever had to undergo the experience of quarantine. Therefore, it seems 
that having a closer relation to risk or to the event of the infection itself 
increased trust, both generalised interpersonal trust and institutional trust, and 
also the tendency to civic engagement. However, the data we possess in this 
regard cannot be statistically generalised to the universe of reference seeing that 
several cases do not pass the test of statistical significance. Only the variable of 
civic engagement passes the significance test, in all the crosstabulations with all 
the variables of the closer relation with the infection, and therefore such data 
can be statistically generalised. It is again interesting to see that, as regards the 
sample in question, simply having to undergo the experience of isolation in 
quarantine reduced interpersonal trust and, in part, institutional trust. This 
appears reasonable, since having to stay at a rigidly determined distance from 
others may well affect the general sense of trust. Yet the phenomenon of 
lockdown did not produce the same reaction, indeed showing an increase in 
generalised interpersonal trust. In Table 6 we show a more concise reading of 
the analysis presented here. 
TABLE 5. Experiences relating to contagion and trust levels. 
 % n 




Went to A&E because suffering one or more influenza symptoms  3.8 
Was in quarantine  22.2 
Had a swab test to check for presence of coronavirus 4.7 
Was diagnosed as having coronavirus 2.5 
A person close to interviewee was diagnosed as having 
coronavirus 
13.8 









 % n Media S.D. Media S.D. Media S.D. 




6.38 2.36 3.78 1.84 4.24 3.26 
Experiences or acts that 
reveal contact or direct 
fear of contact with 
contagion  
34.8 6.61 2.46 4.09 1.78 5.40 3.07 
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7.  Conclusions 
At the end of the data analysis we can in fact say that the pandemic 
phenomenon and the lockdown season, which had such an impact on the daily 
life of Italians in the period between March and May 2020, also produced certain 
effects on the wider spectrum of sociality in general. 
In particular, at the end of the lockdown an increase was visible in 
generalised interpersonal trust with respect to a previous survey of November 
2017. This confirms what has been theoretically presumed by several parties: 
the fact that the common condition of danger in which individuals found 
themselves acted as a generating mechanism for a social solidarity attitude that 
might explain the events emerging among the population: the many flash mobs 
and the acts of solidarity such as volunteering and donations to public 
institutions, particularly to health institutions. An increase in civic behaviour is 
also shown in the civic engagement index elaborated in our investigation and 
by the increase in the hours devoted gratuitously to the benefit of others. In the 
lockdown stage, according to the data, social associationism may have played 
an important role in stimulating behaviour tending towards interpersonal 
assistance and civic engagement. 
Furthermore, the fact emerges from the data that those who experienced a 
closer proximity to the contagion in terms of personal risk or acquaintance with 
infected people show higher levels in all three indicators examined in this work 
(generalised interpersonal trust, trust in institutions and civic engagement). 
The question is different regarding trust in the institutions: in this case the 
interval between the two surveys shows a reduction in institutional trust. The 
reduction of the trust level is generalised, since it involves all the institutions 
without distinction, starting from the non-profit bodies which enjoy the greatest 
level of trust, down to the political parties which are to be found in the lowest 
level of the classificatio. 
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